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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# **MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS; IS IT WORTH IT?**

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARK A. BELLINI United States Army

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## USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

## Multinational Logistics; Is it Worth It?

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ii

### **ABSTRACT**

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The United States military is increasingly involved in multinational operations with NATO and non-NATO nations. We have demonstrated an increasing propensity to use military force for non-defensive conflicts, under the auspices of United Nations resolutions or the NATO umbrella. Our participation in these multinational efforts has also come at a time when we are postured with fewer forces across the board. Given the nature of multinational operations it seems logical to work together with other nations in limited mission type operations to reduce the total required logistics force strengths and to leverage emerging logistics capabilities of other nations. Nation building and humanitarian operations are weighted towards logistics. This is a dramatic departure from the Cold War era, where combat formations were the preeminent force, supported by the necessary logistics. In operations short of war, logistics could be the predominant force. Given our increasing national desires to deploy military forces, as part of an alliance or coalition, logistics consolidation and cooperation is appealing to reduce redundancy and lower costs. This paper concludes with the inherent difficulties in multinational logistics and offers some recommendations for future multinational logistics operations. American soldiers require and deserve the requisite logistics, unilaterally.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
THE SITUATION	1
THE NEAR TERM FUTURE; CLINTON POLICIES	2
NATO LOGISTICS; DOES NATO FOLLOW ITS OWN DOCTRINE?	5
	10
CONCLUSIONS; TWO PLUS TWO MAY NOT EQUAL FOUR	13
ENDNOTES	17
BIBLIOGRAPHY	21

## **MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS: IS IT WORTH IT?**

#### The Situation

As the United States continues to slowly cede its lead and domineering role in defense matters around the world, we've become more of a team player than a coach. This tapering off downward spiral of overseas commitments started with the end of the Cold War in Europe and has continued through the NATO intervention in Serbia and it's province of Kosovo. In the period of the Cold War, 1950-1989, the United States wielded great influence of the defense of Europe. We gained this influence and the positions of leadership by our force contributions, both tactical and strategic. In short we brought the most capability to the alliance and in return we led the planning and execution efforts. Although we still have extensive influence in NATO and around the world; as our forward deployed commitments have been reduced so has our capability and influence. The cooperative nature of NATO through the 1980's was simple: either go it alone or follow the lead of the Americans. With a few notable exceptions, like France, most Central European nations followed U.S. lead and we established many of the rules.

The NATO alliance has an extensive array of all encompassing Standard NATO Agreements (STANAGS). These agreements were developed to increase the compatibility NATO nations' capabilities and enhance interoperability. In the defense plans for central Europe, they played an important, but not absolute role in force readiness and sustainment. This system allowed nations in Europe the freedom to develop their own logistics systems to support a defensive war in Europe. Even under United States leadership there was ample room for nations to employ differing weapons systems and their support arrangements. This worked fine because nations were given defensive sectors. Although the alliance was and is a collective security agreement, the individual nature of nation's military forces and their primarily geographic roles allowed national systems to have precedence vice NATO standard systems.

The current world environment is far removed from the Cold War era. The United States has become involved in unilateral actions as well as an increasing level of participation in multinational operations with both NATO and non-NATO nations. Sometimes working side by side with our Cold War enemies, even sharing resources and logistics. We have demonstrated an increasing propensity to use military force for non-defensive conflicts, under the auspices of United Nations resolutions or the NATO umbrella. Our participation in these multinational efforts have also come at a time when we are postured with fewer forces across the board, from air, ground and seas based platforms to our logistics capabilities. Given the nature of multinational operations it seems logical to work together with other nations in limited mission type operations to reduce the total required logistics force strengths and to leverage the emerging logistics capabilities of other nations. The implications for logistics are pretty clear.

In operations short of war, logistics could be the *predominant* force. Nation building and humanitarian operations are weighted towards logistics. This is a dramatic departure from the Cold War era, where combat formations were the preeminent force, supported by the necessary logistics. Now the opposite can be true. Logistics forces, supported and protected by combat forces, may have the leading and predominant role in peace operations. Given our increasing national desires to deploy military forces, as part of an alliance or coalition, logistics consolidation and cooperation is appealing to reduce redundancy and potential lower costs.

This paper will examine the United States role and propensity to engage in multinational operations and evaluate the subsequent role of multinational logistics in our military policy.

# The Near Term Future The Clinton Policies and Presidential Directives 25 and 56 (PDD25/56)

On 31 March 1995, President Clinton declared complete success for the multinational mission to restore democracy in Haiti with the following statement. "A 30 nation multinational force, led by the United States entered Haiti with a clear mission: to ensure the departure of the military regime, to restore the freely elected government, and to establish a secure and stable environment in which the people of Haiti could begin to rebuild their country. Today, that mission has been accomplished, on schedule, and with remarkable success." He uttered these words during the United Nations Transition ceremony in Port Au Prince, Haiti. Today, the success of the mission in Haiti is debatable, but a more relevant question looms large for national security policy makers. Are we prepared to execute similar missions in the future, guided by this national policy?

There are several key documents that discuss national policy matters such as our involvement in Haiti, and other complex contingency operations short of war. Most of these polices were drafted *after* the 1994 deployment of forces to Haiti. Presidential Directive 25 (PDD 25) is the seminal document on this subject. This classified document was drafted in 1995 at the behest of the President. On February 22,1996 an unclassified summary was released by the State Department, Bureau of International Organizational Affairs.<sup>5</sup>

PPD 25 is an interagency product that the President signed after consulting with selected members of Congress. It's purpose is to clarify our nation's peacekeeping (operations other than war) policy; i.e. when, where, how and why we would intervene with military forces for peace, regional stability and promotion of democracy.<sup>6</sup> There are six major issues/tenets addressed in PDD 25. The executive summary makes it very clear, though, our armed forces primary mission is warfighting, and peacekeeping

is only a tool in preventing wars. This is a very significant aspect of the PDD with consequences for logistics forces structure. With warfighting as the stated primary mission, our logistics capability must be capable of sustaining combat operations, not just peace operations. Very brief summaries of the six major tenets of PDD 25 include:7 1) U.S. involvement must selective, and effective. Spells out 9 critical conditions for involvement but qualifies these with the disclaimer "...aid in decision making; they do not by themselves constitute a prescriptive device." 2) Current U.S. costs for UN peace operations must be reduced. 3) Command and control of U.S forces: The U.S. president will never relinquish command of U.S forces; however he may place U.S forces under operational control of a foreign commander when doing so "serves American security interests" 4) The United Nations capability to manage and lead peace operations must be improved. PDD 25 recommended 11 steps for this improvement including increased U.S. support in planning, logistics, information management, and command and control. 5) Stipulates a "shared responsibility" among United States agencies to manage and fund United Nations led peace operations. Department of Defense will take initial U.S. lead in management and funding when U.S. combat forces are involved, State Department will do so if U.S. military combat forces are not committed. State Department maintains lead on all diplomacy matters. 6) Stipulates seven steps for increased cooperation and information flow between the executive and legislative branches, and the American people. American citizen support is seen as crucial.

The remainder of the thirteen-page summary has details of the six key points, mostly in terms of cooperating with the United Nations and our involvement in a United Nations lead or directed peace operation. The summary is a rational, methodical policy that addresses many of the issues that were discussed by pundits and policy strategists following the United States involvement in Somalia, where the United States suffered numerous casualties in our pursuit of peace as well as the operation in Haiti. In addition to the summary of the six key points there is an unwritten but alluded to description of the ends, ways and means method of strategy formulation and policy implementation. The PDD infers that all three must be in place or achievable in order for the U.S. to become involved. Further, the ends must be defined by timeframes (metrics for success and actual end dates) and dollar costs, before involvement. This in and of itself, if strictly adhered to, will force planners to do the detailed assessments, estimates and planning for the ends, ways and means as a former professor at the United States Army War College envisioned the process in the late 1970s. There are also subtle, yet identifiable aspects on the use of military power and U.S. commitment to operations from the Weinberger and Power Doctrines included in the PDD.

PPD 25, from reviewing the unclassified summary, is written with the military in mind. The United States military, especially the Army and Marine Corps have embraced a deliberate planning process for analyzing a situation thoroughly, developing options and applying the ends, ways and means test. <sup>10</sup> Since PDD 25 shoulders most of the burden of peace operations on the Department of Defense, it makes

sense that this document and its tenets were formulated with military planners in mind. However, many peace operations have root causes that require very long-term commitments to resolve. Most military planners are skilled at developing quick decisive solutions against an opponent but not adept at resolving long term cultural, ethnic, economic or social problems that are often at the core of peace operations dilemmas. Military planners have an understandable short-term focus. The nation normally calls on the Defense Department when all other avenues of success fail in foreign policy. As the national "911" capability, the military is expected to quickly restore order or discipline where were there may have been none for quite some time. In short, they are normally called to do what no one else can, quickly. This condition setting by military forces has the potential to permit the Department of State to orchestrate diplomatic and economic efforts.

Throughout PDD 25 is the recurring theme of supporting the United Nations in peace operations, as part of the world community, not as an independent actor in world affairs. This theme is consistent with the President's view of the "global village and global economy". This could place an increased burden on our already stretched logistics capability if we are called on to provide resources to support less capable participant partners. Other documents that are pertinent in this discussion include *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, published in October 1998, and Presidential Directive 56 (PDD 56) signed by President Clinton on 20 May 1997. 12

Surprisingly, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* does not mention peace operations directly. Globalization is the recurring theme while protecting global economics is the capstone concern for global security. In the chapter entitled *Advancing U.S. National Interests*, use of military force unilaterally to protect our national interests is, however, well articulated; "We will do what we must to defend these interests, including -when necessary-using our military might unilaterally and decisively". <sup>13</sup> This openly vague reference grants U.S policy makers freedom and options, but does little to solidify national policy, especially for operations short of war.

PDD 56, labeled *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations* is more prescriptive in nature. Whereas PDD 25 was focused on setting policy for involvement, PDD 56 seeks to define the planning process after the decision to deploy has been made. Interagency cooperation and planning are viewed as key and essential elements of success. In an attempt to fully coordinate political and military efforts, PDD 56 directs that a political-military plan be developed and rehearsed prior to commitment of resources to ensure the various agency plans are synchronized, and priorities and resources are properly set and allocated. This is very similar to military rehearsals that have proven effective in both tactical and operational single service and operational joint warfighting preparations. In addition, PDD 56 attempts to establish agency accountability. <sup>14</sup> Another mandate in this document is the requirement for after action reviews (AAR) after the completion of each

and every operation. Not only are the participating agencies required to contribute to the AAR process, other government experts with knowledge of the operation are invited to participate as well. <sup>15</sup>

The real jewel in PDD 56 is an annual training requirement for the NSC and selected education activities, including the U.S. Army War College and the National Defense University. This forces interagency discussion of the issues, and could have many positive effects resulting from the lessons learned from prior AARs and the pooling of academic and practitioner talents during the training sessions. <sup>16</sup> PDD 56 concludes with an Annex (Annex A) that lists, in sequence, components of a Political-Military plan for Complex Contingency Operations. Short and to the point, this PPD resembles segments from an U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Battlebook for planning. In summary, the concepts in PDD 56 are straightforward, well defined and are a useful guide for wide ranging interagency planning, after action reviews and training for peace operations.

These documents are useful, well written, and open ended enough to allow flexibility, while being prescriptive enough to have meaning in the interagency process. The Clinton Administration, with the support of many Federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, has codified a viable policy for at least the next decade. The remaining question is will we be disciplined enough to follow it? Some experts, like a prestigious member of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, have doubts we will follow our own policies, based on our recent experience in Kosovo.<sup>17</sup> The Clinton administration has developed an appropriate policy. Military planners have the policy decisions to carry us into the foreseeable future, wrought from our lessons learned in Somalia, Haiti and other places. However, we only have real lessons learned, when we modify our behavior. The bottom line to all of this is that the United States military will continue to participate in missions other than war. Our post Cold War military as a whole and logistics force structure will be expected to do more and more, not less as part of a coalition or alliance.

# NATO Logistics Does NATO Follow it's Own Doctrine?

NATO can be viewed as a slightly maligned from the standpoint of logistics. On one hand it clearly states that logistics are a national responsibility. On the other it suggests, even encourages, cooperation amongst, NATO and non-NATO partners. In NATO's Logistics Handbook the true responsibilities are spelled out. "Each nation bears ultimate responsibility for ensuring the provision of logistics support for its forces allocated to NATO...." NATO encouraging cooperation and the formation of bi-lateral and multinational agreements spells out the desired part of this. But the organizational

systems and the realities of the alliance make true multinational logistics more of a desired goal than a mandate. True multinationality is very difficult to achieve. In NATO literature there is a very pronounced preference for multinationality, to the point of interdependence for solidarity of national policy. NATO has taken the position that multinationality, as a key principle, should be applied throughout the Alliance. The stated reason includes cohesion, solidarity and task sharing, as well as a "disincentive for renationalization of defence policy. In other words to keep the Alliance together, especially during a transition period between the end of the Cold War and the emerging world situation." However there is a little more to NATO's embracing multinationality than their adaptation to the end of the Cold War. NATO itself, with no peer competitor was reexamining its own role in Europe. The defensive nature of the Alliance remained the stated reason for its continued existence, but just as the United States was changing national policy, as realized in the Clinton aspirations through PDD 25 and PDD 56, NATO too, looked beyond defense to missions other than war. The logistics implications were then and are today still, tremendous. NATO was breaking new ground with its transition towards having an expeditionary military alliance.

In 1958, a still struggling NATO, through it's governing body; the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved a collective system for logistics called the NATO Maintenance Supply Services System (NMSSS). Its goal was to "... make the best use of NATO resources and to sustain the common defense...." Initially spare parts were its focus. Some of the NATO military partners used common equipment and NATO was looking for a way to reduce cost while maintaining readiness. As is sometimes the case, even today with logistics, this new organization was separate from the rest of NATO and not funded with common NATO budgets. 21 In other words it was an organization that depended solely on its ability to assist NATO partners for a surcharge fee. Just like a commercial competitive business it had to be self-sufficient. Today, NATO budget policy is virtually unchanged when it comes to logistics. Common funded items include four areas: air defense, command and control, training and exercises, and reinforcement reception.<sup>22</sup> The only one of these that is logistics related is the last one which deals with improving infrastructure such as air and seaports, staging facilities etc. There is a very detailed and lengthy process of submitting projects for common NATO funding for infrastructure improvements. Normally these are long term projects that require significant planning. Some examples include sea and airport improvement construction projects. Since 1958 and the formation of NMSS, little has changed in common funding for logistics. The lack of common funding has allowed nations their prerogatives, but it has also resulted in a stifling of true multinationality. It's in the documents, but its not widely practiced as it is envisioned by the developers of NATO's doctrine. Without common funding, logistically capable nations, like the United States become "providers", and not receivers of multinational logistics services. This results in an overall capable alliance, but does not provide the United States much in the way of logistics force structure savings. Until requirements are reduced, the actual physical logistics force structure is needed.

By 1994 NATO was thinking of new ways of not only commanding and controlling forces, but the organizations themselves to effectively handle the current security concerns. This thought process led to the development of more multinational structures. In the 1998 Edition of the NATO Handbook, the logic is explained: "In particular, it was agreed that future security arrangements would call for easily deployable, multinational, multi-service military formations tailored to specific kinds of military tasks. These included humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as well as collective defense. The forces required would vary according to the circumstances and would need to be generated rapidly and at short notice." In September 1994, the Military Committee of NATO agreed on the Terms of Reference for NATO's Long Term Study. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) initiated this study. NATO was searching for relevance and possible survival as an organization. By expanding their role to include peacekeeping, they were transforming into an expeditionary alliance, that required small, flexible and deployable force packages and a change in its logistics methods.<sup>23</sup>

In fairness to NATO, the political changes in Europe were in large part driving the transformation. When the Soviet Republic dissolved, NATO launched into a program of reaching out to former Soviet block nations as a method of encouraging European stability. Named Partnership for Peace (PfP), this program propelled NATO and many of its alliance nations into long range engagements out of area. This program no doubt influenced the expeditionary thinking of the designers of the post Cold War alliance. NATO's current Handbook has a fairly detailed rationale for multinationality; "Increased multinationality" has also been an important factor in the development of the new defence posture. It has provided enhanced opportunities for multinational task sharing among Allies, allowing military capabilities available to NATO to be maintained or enhanced and ensuring that the most effective use can be made of resources allocated for defence purposes. The principle of "multinationality" is applied throughout Alliance structures and is of key importance for NATO's solidarity and cohesion, for the conduct of Alliance missions, and as a disincentive for the renationalisation of defence policy."<sup>24</sup>

To carry out these policies NATO had to change. And that change is still underway. Since the early 1990's NATO has developed a series of multinational organizations. Most notably is the Ace Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The ARRC is an army corps headquarters located at the old British Army of the Rhein (BAOR) headquarters at Rheindallen, Germany. This multinational force organization has few standing forces. Its force structure is based on, promises of force contributions from alliance nations when needed. The British serve as the Framework Nation, whereas they furnish much of the headquarters infrastructure and communications capability. This arrangement has worked well, due in large part to the competence of the British and the quality of their equipment contributions. NATO nations have offered forces to fill the corps requirements, on an as needed basis. National concurrence with

proposed missions enables nations to only commit forces when they desire. Bottom line, it's a volunteer force.

These force contributions are as large as a US division level equivalent. The challenge NATO and nations face with this type of arrangement is the extremely cumbersome method that is required to activate the corps with sufficient forces to respond, for anything other than for planning countering an attack against central Europe. The reality is that these force "contributions", are apportioned against many national requirements and commitments simultaneously. National priorities and agendas will always supercede those of the collective body unless the threat is substantial enough to threaten the very survival of all the participants. When national prerogatives are entered into the process, like out of area operations for NATO or peacekeeping, the political machinations will frustrate and delay military planning throughout the process. It is even more troubling when logistics are concerned for several reasons. Most nations have not invested in sufficient logistics capability for out of area operations, or if they do have enough, its just enough. Just like the United States, many nations have continued to accept risk in standing logistics capability. With minimum national capability, most nations are reluctant to give up their logistics capability for multinational use or sharing. What this equates to in a multinational military structure like the ARRC is the paucity of logistics under the control of the commander. ARRC does have a standing subordinate logistics headquarters, the Rear Support Command (RSC), but its function is geared more towards enabling force deployment, than force sustainment. They have multinational plans and operations staff sections but no logistics capability. Just as in generating combat forces, the ARRC depends on the generosity of Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) for logistics capability. This process of force nomination and generation proved cumbersome, time consuming and burdensome during the ARRC's first real test, the peace implementation mission (IFOR) in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Even when TCNs nominated combat units during force generation they often failed to nominate appropriate logistics capability to support their own units. Some TCNs expected NATO at large to provide logistics. 25

The suitability of multinational logistics was thoroughly studied by the Central Region in the years right prior to the intensive planning for the Yugoslavia mission, and the ARRCs deployment into Bosnia. As early as 1993, the commander of land forces for the Central Region was tasked by the Central Regions Chiefs of Army Staff Talks (CR-CAST) to review logistics in a focused manner. His tasking was to examine the logistics responsibilities and authority of multinational forces. <sup>26</sup> Up until this time, NATO's focus for logistics was based on defending central Europe from a Soviet invasion. Out of area missions and peacekeeping operations weren't an issue. NATO wide reductions in forces led to multinationality becoming more than a concept; it was part of NATO emerging doctrine and policy.

After intensive study, the multinational group of officers reported out their draft findings. There were some problems with movement control of national movements, methods of funding and contracting as well as training and standardization for multinational logistics. In addition they recommended establishment of NATO Command and Control organizations at the Theater and Corps level for multinational logistics. After the findings were released the alliance nations had an opportunity to comment on them. The national responses to the draft study were very reflective of the manner in which multinational organizations really operate, even when they have written and agreed to Standard NATO Agreements (STANAG) and Terms of Reference like NATO members have had done for the last 40 some years. They disagreed over just about every aspect of the study reports. Their national views were different, their ideas about what constitutes logistics were different, and their national response proposals reflected these differences.<sup>27</sup>

The CR-CAST study also examined the effects of the new MC 319, NATO's multinational logistics manual. This manual posits the case for "collective responsibility" for logistics. The intent of MC 319 is to grant NATO commanders sufficient authority to redistribute logistics, when needed, for success of the operation. Anytime you bring redistribution of national assets into the equation; it dramatically raises the stakes and gets nations and military commanders excited. If this manual is taken literally, it can be threatening to some nations, especially those with vulnerable logistics capability. 28 The CR-CAST. however determined that the intent of MC 319 was not to allow NATO commanders routine redistribution authority. However substantial planning effort was put into NATO plans for the evolving potential missions in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, using MC 319 as the rationale, against the wishes of many national military planning representatives. After the CR-CAST study was reviewed by members of the Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in 1995 a more reasonable planning approach was taken.<sup>29</sup> Language in a manual, or plan is subject to different interpretations when there is a single service or nations. The problems are exponentially greater when different nations and languages are involved. AFSOUTH planners suffered through the issues of interpretations amongst nations. Forty plus years of NATO nations cooperating did not mean they agreed very much on logistics. Even the STANAGS were questioned repeatedly by national military planners if they were not in their nations' current best interest. In example national military planners could not agree on logistics issues for common but required commodities like food and fuel. Numerous planning conferences were held at AFSOUTH, the ARRC HQs and SHAPE HQs to discuss NATO's involvement in the Balkans. During these conferences the basics of logistics support were repeatedly debated among the planners of alliance nations with little resolution. NATO could not meet TCN logistics responsibilities, even though during the planning some TCNs were counting on a full array of multinational logistics support. NATO TCNs endorsed the idea of common logistics but they were not willing to contribute the forces necessary for true multinational logistics. However, logistics became much clearer for nations once they realized they were still responsible for their force sustainment. The cost of participating would include national responsibility

to support forces. The agreement and level of cooperation amongst planners was far greater when their individual national methods, systems and preferences were allowed, and mulitnationality not forced on them. <sup>30</sup>

Multinational obligation of funds was very much debated by the CR-CAST and NATO nations. Unfortunately it still is. Each nation has national funding and legal issues to contend with. This proved to be a major stumbling block during the planning for Bosnia. Neither the ARRC nor the theater headquarters had a checkbook to pay for logistics. When the commander can't fund an action he sometimes has difficulty directing it. Nations controlled the money and therefore retained complete control. There is nothing wrong with this, and a good argument could be made for this method of ensuring that national prerogatives are retained. However the lack of common funding reduces the case for the pooling" of resources that is so paramount in NATO documents.<sup>31</sup> In the latest version of the *NATO Handbook* logistics is not mentioned, nor is it mentioned in the section about a cost sharing. Logistics is multinational in NATO, but the money for it almost purely national.<sup>32</sup>

# US Doctrine Trying to Fit Round Pegs in Square Holes

Internationally recognized management consultant and strategic planning expert Henry Mintzberg is often attributed with saying that since you can not know what is in the future, you can not forecast, nor plan for it. 33 For multinational logistics, our corporate inability to foresee that multinational peace operations would dominate our military commitments may have been a contributing factor for the lack of joint or service multinational logistics doctrine. Fortunately the United States Army has invested a lot of intellectual capital in the area of multinational logistics with some proven successes, especially in semistatic peace operations, like the current operations in the Balkans. Unfortunately there is a void in doctrine for US forces for multinational logistics. There is a draft Joint publication on the subject being reviewed currently. The draft, although well written, is cumbersome and not very definitive. The subject itself is very problematic and ambiguous therefore developing and describing the doctrinal principles are difficult to articulate. The authors of this draft document are to be commended for their ability to craft a doctrinal manual in the first place. But the utility of combining our doctrine with that of undetermined allies, all with undetermined systems makes the manual of limited value currently. The issues wrestled with in this draft document focus extensively on the tactical level of logistics, and therein lie the challenge.

Tactical logistics is very difficult for a single service, let alone for joint or multinational forces. With all the unknowns of future alliance or coalition operations it's next to impossible to produce a really useful doctrine at the tactical level until you limit the scope of the issues. There is a need to produce this

manual, so the services can use it as a guide for their own doctrine development, but it should emphasize operational and strategic level issues and leave the tactical level subjects alone. By referring to tactical I mean the continual reference to low level logistics sharing, command and control of logistics and reallocation authority. Tactical commanders are going to do what it takes to accomplish the mission, while caring for their troops, as long as they are properly resourced. In logistics, as in combat operations, there is no magic growth of capability by working together with other nations. Logistics requirements are by definition, requirements. The only way that less tactical logistics is acceptable is to reduce the requirements or redefine what services or other sustainment will be provided. Therefore the focus should be on meeting the defined requirements, not seeking multinational solutions for sustaining our forces. Since most nations have taken risk in logistics with reduced active logistics force structure, no nation has excess tactical logistics capability. In fact the United States is reducing our logistics capability, counting on a multitude of alternatives for sustainment. Depending on sustainment from a yet to be determined ally, in a yet to be determined area is an interesting yet very dangerous thought process. The United States is on a path of accepting more and more risk with our current logistics initiatives. One prime example is the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). This program is designed to "... provide rapid, responsive support anywhere, anytime."34 Sounds like the same mission normally assigned to military logistics forces. We are reducing inventories, reducing logistics forces structure and depending on contractors and technology more and more for our logistics support. In peacetime or semi-static peace support operations these measures maybe suitable, effective and efficient, but in war they may be extremely risky. As long as we have the national will to send forces in harms way, we should also have the national will and resources to sustain them, unilaterally if necessary. Joint and service doctrine must carry this theme throughout any multinational proposals.

With joint doctrine being produced, the Army's Logistics Management College (ALMC) at Fort Lee is developing a course to teach multinational logistics. Fortunately ALMC has a few officers from other nations on their staff to lend a multinational perspective to the lesson plan development. Without approved doctrine and no courses on the subject, how are we accomplishing multinational logistics today? The same way soldiers in the American army have been accomplishing numerous tasks, with minimal resources in the past. They improvise, using every tool available to them. European Command (EUCOM) has done a remarkable job of implementing multinational logistics, and their methods and focus are in line with what our policy towards multinational logistics should be, at the operational level, rather than what is being written in our emerging alliance and joint doctrine.

EUCOM has taken a practical approach to leveraging our national logistics capability and that of other nations. They are accomplishing this by using Replacement in Kind (RIK) as a logistics currency that can be traded and accounted for across the multinational lines of agreeing partners. In 1980 NATO simplified the logistics exchange procedures for NATO nations. The NATO Mutual Support Act (NMSS)

enabled simplified authority for acquiring support from other nations in exchange for cash payments or replacement in kind. With Department of States concurrence, Department of Defense may permit the entering of support agreements with NATO allies and subsidiary organizations. These arrangements permit support transfers outside of and separate to the tightly managed and controlled Foreign Military Sales program (FMS). Since the enactment of this agreement in 1980, its scope has expanded to allow the military commander more flexibility for contingencies including peace support operations.<sup>36</sup>

By 1997 more than the name of this act had changed. Since then these arrangements have been called Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA). The list of items and services that could be "traded" increased to include some services such as airlift. Further, in 1997, additional non-lethal items like certain types of communications equipment could be included in these agreements.<sup>37</sup> The key tenets of ACSA are pretty simple and allow the planning staff and commander great latitude. Services, supplies and support may be acquired from NATO and other International organizations, like the United Nations, and non-NATO nations if one or more of the following conditions are met: have a standing defense alliance with the United States; permit the stationing of United States troops on their soil, allow prepositioning of United States assets or they host United States forces exercises or operations. The method of payment can be cash, RIK or Equal Value Exchange (EVE). One of the best aspects of ACSA is that no formal agreement is required. For cross servicing, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) must designate a country to be ACSA eligible. Services retain the responsibility for payment accounting, reporting, billing and collecting debt. Payments can be made after the event, allowing the commander to make decisions and execute prior completing the paperwork. The only other limit besides the regulatory exclusion of some items and services is a dollar ceiling limit with NATO and non-NATO countries. respectively. Fortunately these ceilings may be waved during periods of contingencies, humanitarian and foreign disaster assistance operations.<sup>38</sup> These rules fit rather well with the PDDs effecting military use in the future, like the Clinton Administration's PDD 25 and 56. Some examples of permitted items and services include: petroleum, food, clothing, transportation, port services, medical services, spares, billeting, airlift, communication services, some ammunition and repair and maintenance services. On the prohibited list include weapon systems, major end items, guided missiles, naval mines and torpedoes, guidance kits for bombs and chaff devices.<sup>39</sup> The prohibited list is a sensible one that does not tie the commanders hands and protects the integrity of the FMS process as well as controlling the release of sensitive military capability.

Not only does EUCOM use ACSA but they have leveraged the process during the Balkan operations. Specifically they have, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, used ACSA for several operational level multinational logistics operations. The United States loaned signal beacons to the Germans, provided UHF satellite channel access to the British and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and provided 2 roll on/roll off (RO/RO) to transport the Allied Rapid Reaction

Corps to Croatia. These are good examples of the proper use of multinational logistics. Notice that these are "outgoing" logistics. That's the way the majority will be as long as we are a logistically capable force. As long as we focus on the operational level of multinationality we are leveraging the best of each contributing nation and not risking our tactical forces sustainability. Even for some lower level agreements, like trading medical support and services with the Nordic Battalion in Bosnia we are ahead, without unduly burdening the tactical level commanders. It's when we try to develop tactical multinational level units, adhoc coordination centers and headquarters organizations at the start of a contingency, we not only confuse tactical level units, we limit their combat flexibility and complicate their operations. The Joint Staff and EUCOM are performing multinational logistics in the best manner. Our emerging doctrine and rush to transform logistics down to the lowest level however, is far removed from the benefits of operational cooperation and is filled with uncalled for risk. Currently EUCOM is the leader in ACSA with 24 of the 35 agreements on the national books. Pacific Command (USPACOM) is a distant second with 7. EUCOM has the advantage due to the nature and extent of the NATO alliance, and they are aggressively leveraging this method of support. Their actions meet the intent of MC 319, while not jeopardizing our tactical logistics posture

# Conclusions Two Plus Two May Not Equal Four

The United States has clearly changed the way in which it views the use of military forces during the Clinton administration. The President's use of Presidential Directives coupled with an increased propensity to commit the United States military for operations other than war has been part and part of his "globalization" efforts. Working side by side with other nations in peace and war has some positive points for the military planner to consider. Cooperation and coordination with allies should always be the preferred method. However, this should not imply that the United States should reduce its combat effectiveness, flexibility or sustainment power just to gain some efficiency. Being in a partnership with other nations' forces, in the NATO alliance, implies that each partner has something contribute. Forces that arrive without the necessary sustainment power may be more of a hindrance in operations other than war, let alone combat situations. Building and maintaining armies is expensive and serious national business, requiring national sacrifices and commitment. Short-term reliance on other nations to carry our logistics load or even part of it is not in our best interest. The army is currently undergoing transformation to increase strategic speed to troubled spots in the world. Speed is not gained by the use of ad hoc cobbling together of logistics headquarters or units. Recent PDDs coupled with the reduced size of our force translates into higher velocity of forces, especially logistics forces. With the current trend towards

contracting and best business practices we may be headed to the point we are so dependant on contractors and other nations that our ability to act unilaterally will be slower, rather than faster.

Our emerging doctrine struggles with the unknowns of multinational logistics. As well written as the draft publication is, it portrays only a marginally useful doctrine for the employment of logistics in a multinational environment. It's not the fault of the authors; it's the subject and the convoluted method of command and control and national approvals that makes coherency so elusive. We routinely, and willingly, trade off logistics force structure to lessen the footprint, when in reality we need more logistics capability to carry out missions that we are forecasting. In fact, I believe that the logistics capability we bring to multinational operations is one of our most important strengths. Many other nations view multinational logistics as synonymous with United States logistics. Their willingness to participate may be directed related to our willingness to sustain their force contributions. So far we have had some success with multinational logistics, but getting there has been painful and slow. Further we haven't really used this type of logistics in armed conflict to any great degree. Recent real testing of an alliance routinely sharing critical logistics in combat has not been done to any great extent. Trust is a perishable yet desirable attribute in any partnership. However, depending on it, when things may turn sour is not something the American soldier should accept for their support in combat. Depending on personal relationships should not be a part of our doctrine for multinational operations. Most people would say we are beyond that, but the reality of multinational operations is that cooperation is more prevalent than actual command or control. In fact it's written in both the alliance doctrine and the emerging United States joint doctrine. Nations do not want to relinquish limited logistics assets that enable and sustain their forces. Nothing should be more sensitive to a nation than its ability to sustain their soldiers in combat. If a nation is willing to risk, or has to risk its national treasure and blood of their youth, then they should be more than willing to commit the necessary resources to properly sustain them. Furnishing logistics on the cheap, or counting on others, is not only fool hardy it is borderline shameful. This is not to say that there should be no multinational logistics methods employed. Quite the contrary, there are certain problematic deployment and sustainment functions that can and should be consolidated. But until nations are committed enough to fund and resource standing multinational logistics planning staffs, until nations are committed enough to develop common funding arrangements, the path to multinational logistics will be paved with unnecessary hazards, risks and time delaying complications. Those who bear the brunt of these issues will continue to be military commanders and their assigned forces. As we rush to develop the joint doctrine, establish courses on multinational logistics we should actually learn our lessons from our operations in Bosnia and evaluate the ramifications of political decisions like PDDs. Until we modify our behavior from these lessons learned they amount to little more than observations that future commanders and soldiers will continue to suffer when there is little justification. All too often we rapidly gloss over the difficulties in our rush to congratulate ourselves during and after a successful operation. Recent history has a great example of the benefits of unfiltered and unsweetened self-criticism and we need to emulate it as much as possible. After the rapid and very successful German invasion into Poland in 1940, the German High Command requested and received critics of the operation. These were used very successfully to improve German doctrine and combat effectiveness. We have After Action Reviews (AAR); some are very detailed and open. However there is a common perception that we consciously or unconsciously varnish over the difficulties or actual effectiveness of some of our corporate actions or procedures. The numerous recent surveys that highlight the thoughts of many of our junior officers about a zero defect problem in the army today further supports the perception. Until we can be brutally honest with our civilian leaders and ourselves we will never actually capture the full benefits of our individual and collective experiences in multinational logistics or any other subject.

There were extensive after action critiques of the mission in Bosnia conducted at the U.S Amy Peace Keeping Institute collocated with the US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks. The published report is very detailed and useful. However, missing from the symposium were some of the key participants in multinational logistics planning. Absent from the forum held in May 1996, were the Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) planners. In fact no one from AFSOUTH attended. Their presence during the discussions would have offered not only first hand knowledge from the Theater perspective but also added some other multinational dimensions as well. The men and women working on NATO's plans, side by side with our allies, best felt the laborious process of multinational logistics, often stifled or even stonewalled by national agendas. They were the ones who had to develop an acceptable plan that could accommodate national concepts and gain national concurrence from a wide-ranging alliance. Written reports and second hand accounts tell only a part of the story. It's the untold and barely spoken part of the process, observed best by first hand participants that adds value to the AAR process. By all accounts the AAR was a thorough process and a very open forum, but the additions of more first hand participants would have added value to the process.

The focus that EUCOM has in implementing ACSA is the right one. They are leveraging national capabilities while not burdening the tactical level commander with multinationality for mulitnationality sake. They are also not forcing another level of control on scarce logistics by building multinational headquarters where there is no need. Nor are they substituting logistics capability, they are adding to it. Further, by vigorously expanding standing ACSA between nations in their region they are preparing for future operations. This is not only smart; it's a prudent use of peacetime staff capability. Their stated goal of and ACSA with every approved nation inside their Area of Responsibility (AOR) is the best method of actually determining what partnership are reasonably available and where the shortfalls are for supporting our forces and alliance or coalition forces. The capability with the ACSA and bilateral agreements is already in place, and EUCOM is taking full advantage of it. Joint doctrine will be written and our service and joint schools will follow with courses on multinational logistics. Hopefully we will focus this doctrinal effort far above the tactical level and capture the possible benefits at the strategic and operational levels.

As long as we approach multinational logistics as an addition to our capabilities not a replacement for national logistics we can only be a stronger, ready force and good partner with our allies. Once we allow our thinking to consider any multinational logistics as a replacement for our organic capability, like we have with contracting, we are exposing our soldiers and our nation to more risk than we can afford. As this is being written NATO is having a difficult time maintaining agreed upon TCN force levels in the Serbia province of Kosovo. <sup>44</sup> This is more testimony to the fickleness of alliance partners in "volunteer" environments prevalent in peace operations.

Our logistics policy and doctrine should never be based on logistics from other nations to sustain our forces. We should never field troops unless we are prepared to fully sustain them unilaterally in peace and war. PDDs may guide our involvement in operations, but we must never forget that American commanders have a moral obligation to insure they have the resources to accomplish their missions. International cooperation is one thing, dependence on foreign armies is another. We should not let it occur. Multinational logistics is worth it, as long as we use this method to augment our capability, not replace it.

(7,801)

### **ENDNOTES**

- <sup>1</sup> NATO Handbook, On Line Edition, 1998; available from <a href="http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/v198.htm">http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/v198.htm</a>; Internet; accessed 22 Jan 2000. (Author's note: the implication of waning US influence although unwritten, in evident by the wording of this document and multiple references to *increased* European responsibilities)
  - <sup>2</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>3</sup> NSC Fact Sheet, "Restoring Democracy to Haiti," available from <a href="http://cbnet/orgs/usacsl/smartbks/nsc/haiti.htm">http://cbnet/orgs/usacsl/smartbks/nsc/haiti.htm</a>; Internet; accessed 5 October 1999.
  - <sup>4</sup>"U.S Effort Has Yet to Rescue Haiti," Dallas Morning News, 12 September 1999.
- <sup>5</sup> "Unlawful Deployment", available from<a href="http://www.personal.psu.edu/users/b/p/bpt106/ppd25.html">http://www.personal.psu.edu/users/b/p/bpt106/ppd25.html</a>; Internet; accessed 11 October 1999.
- <sup>6</sup> <u>PDD 25, Unclassified Summary</u> (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1996), via WWW by the International Organizational Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
  - <sup>7</sup> Ibid
- <sup>8</sup> "Ends, Ways and Means," lecture, Carlisle PA, Dickinson College, September 1999. ( Author's note: from class presentation by a guest speaker, Seminar 15).
  - 9 Ibid.
- <sup>10</sup> "Defense is from Mars State is from Venus," available from<a href="http://pdd56.com/marvenus\_alt.htm">http://pdd56.com/marvenus\_alt.htm</a>; Internet: accessed 13 October 1999.
- <sup>11</sup> Andrew J. Bacevich, "Policing Utopia: The Military Imperatives of Globalization," <u>The National Interest</u> 56 (Summer 1999).
- <sup>12</sup> Mark R. Walsh, and Michael J. Harwood, "Complex Emergencies: Under New Management," Parameters (Winter 1998).
- <sup>13</sup> William J. Clinton, <u>A National Security Strategy for a New Century</u> (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 1998).
- <sup>14</sup> PPD 56 The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations May 1997; available from<a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/doucments/NSCDoc2.html">http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/doucments/NSCDoc2.html</a>; Internet; accessed 13 October 1999.
  - 15 lbid.
- <sup>16</sup> "Defense is from Mars State is from Venus," available from <a href="http://pdd56.com/marvenus\_alt.htm">http://pdd56.com/marvenus\_alt.htm</a>; Internet; accessed 13 October 1999.

- <sup>17</sup> Classroom discussion of PDD 25 and PDD 56 led by an expert in peace operations from the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, discussion held in Seminar 15, Room C219, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S Army War College, 12 October 1999.
  - <sup>18</sup> A quote repeatedly used by the author to his troops to reinforce the results of AARs.
  - <sup>19</sup> NATO, <u>NATO Logistics Handbook</u> (Brussels: NATO, 1994), 20.
- <sup>20</sup> NATO Handbook, On Line Library, "The Military Command Structure; The Role of Integrated Military Forces," 1998; available from <a href="http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/v182.htm">http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/v182.htm</a>; Internet; accessed 22 January 2000.
  - James A. Huston, One for All, NATO Strategy and Logistics Through the Formative Period, 1949–1969 (Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 1984), 240-241.
- <sup>22</sup> General Accounting Office, <u>NATO Enlargement: Report to Congressional Requestors</u> (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, March 1998), 2.
- <sup>23</sup> NATO Handbook, On Line Library, "The Military Command Structure; The Role of Integrated Military Forces.
  - <sup>24</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>25</sup> The author served on NATO's Allied Forces Southern Europe staff as Chief of Plans. He witnessed first hand the frustrations felt in the ARRC planning the logistics for this operation.
- <sup>26</sup> Robert J. Speidel, "Multinational Logistics in NATO: Will it Work?" (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 1996), 11.
  - <sup>27</sup> Ibid., 11-13.
- <sup>28</sup> NATO Military Committee, <u>NATO Principles & Policies For Logistics</u>, MC 319 (SHAPE, Belgium: NATO Military Committee, 17 May 1994).
- <sup>29</sup> Mark A. Bellini, "Implementation Force Logistics Deliberate Planning," briefing slides, HQ Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy, November 1996.
- $^{30}$  The author served on NATO's Allied Forces Southern Europe staff as Chief of Plans, CJ-4 and chaired many of these conferences with the 16 NATO nations military planners.
  - <sup>31</sup> NATO, <u>NATO Logistics Handbook (Brussels: NATO, 1994)</u>, 20.
  - <sup>32</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, <u>NATO Handbook</u>, (Brussels, Belgium, 1998), 198-214.
- <sup>33</sup> Henry Mintzberg, <u>The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning</u> (Toronto: The Free Press 1994), Chapter 4.
  - <sup>34</sup> Army Materiel Command, <u>LOGCAP Battle Book</u> (Alexandria, 2000), 6.

- <sup>35</sup>Jim Scott <scottj1@LEE.ARMY.MIL>, "Multinational Logistics," electronic mail message to Mark A. Bellini <msb27@pa.net>, 8 February 2000.
- <sup>36</sup> Judyann Munley, "Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA)," briefing slides, Pentagon, Joint Staff, J-4, Accessed via internet 12 January 2000.
  - <sup>37</sup> Ibid.
  - 38 Ibid.
  - <sup>39</sup> lbid.
  - <sup>40</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>41</sup> Williamson Murray, "The German Response to Victory in Poland; A Case Study in Professionalism," <u>Armed Forces and Society</u> 7 (Winter 1981): 13.
- <sup>42</sup> US Army Peacekeeping Institute, "Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review," May 1996; available from <a href="http://www.cbnet/orgs/usacls/divisions/pki/militarybosniafr.../bosrep2a.htm">http://www.cbnet/orgs/usacls/divisions/pki/militarybosniafr.../bosrep2a.htm</a>; Internet; accessed 12 January 2000.
- $^{43}$  EUCOM J-4, "EUCOM FOCUSED LOGISTICS" briefing slides, Heidelberg, Germany, EUCOM J-4, accessed via internet 12 January 00.
- <sup>44</sup> Elizabeth Becker, "Not Enough Troops in Kosovo, NATO Say," <u>New York Times</u>, 27 February 2000.

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